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ARGUMENT 
Under the rule inherent in the decision of the court below, where a natural 
stream runs through A's property and continues on through B's property, and 
where B owns a share of water rights in the water running through the natural 
stream, then B has a duty under Utah Code Ann. 73-1-8 to A and to others to 
maintain the natural stream to prevent wasting water or damaging the property of A 
and others. This is an erroneous application of the law, violates public policy, and 
should not be allowed to stand. 
Preservation of Issues 
Lowry first argues that "[p] radically none of Appellant's arguments were 
preserved for this appeal." (Appellee's Brief, p. 10). However, the statutory 
grounds for the decision below were never raised by anyone prior to the court's 
decision but were raised sua sponte by the court itself in the Court's decision. 
Indeed, Lowry concedes that the two statutes, UCA §73-1-8 and §UCA 57-13a-
102, were never raised until they appeared in the Court's Memorandum Decision 
and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 11, 12). 
Thus there was never the opportunity for Lowry to raise any objection to 
their application to this case. Palmer cites to the Court to State ex. rel. D.B., 2010 
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WL 1794700, 2010 UT App 111, _ P . 3 d _ for the proposition that it was 
incumbent upon Lowry to raise the court's surprise reliance on the statutes via 
post-judgment motion in order for the issues to be preserved. However, in that case, 
the court held that the appellant did have notice of the issue appealed from during 
the proceedings below, in contrast to the present case where it is not disputed that 
the issue was not raised except by the Court in its decision. 
In State ex. rel D.B., D.B. asserted that the juvenile courtfs finding of 
accomplice liability was in violation of his due process rights because the State 
neither gave D.B. specific notice that it was pursuing an accomplice liability theory 
nor did the State actually request that the juvenile court utilize such a theory. Id. at 
Tf 5. The State responded that D.B. failed to preserve his due process challenge in 
the juvenile court. Id. Rather than arguing that D.B. properly preserved the issue 
for appeal, D.B. argued that preservation is irrelevant because the State gave no 
indication that it was pursuing a theory of accomplice liability and hence, there was 
nothing to object to during the trial. Id. at j^ 7. 
The Court disagreed that D.B. was not given notice that such a theory was 
being pursued because accomplice liability is not a separate offense from principal 
liability and a person charged with a crime has adequate notice of the possibility of 
accomplice liability being raised at trial because conviction of accomplice and 
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principal liability do not require proof of different elements or nroof of different 
quality. Id at f 8. 
Unlike in State ex. rel D.B., there was no indication in the present case that 
the court would rely on the statutes because they were never raised until they 
appeared in the Court's Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. Thus, the rule Lowry quotes from Stpte ex. rel D.B. - that a 
failure to object either at trial, at the time of adjudication, or through a post 
judgment motion deprives the trial court of its opportunity to address the claimed 
error and thus fails to preserve a claim - is inapplicable to the present case. 
Lowry further asserts that Palmer failed to preserve the argument that the 
easement granted by the court violates public policy. However, the court itself 
noted the frivolous circumstances which brought this case, characterizing them, in 
the court's own words, as a "big pissing contest." (TR. ROA p. 130, 222:13-14). 
Palmer additionally argued to the court that 
the purpose for which they claim any prescriptive easement doesn't 
exist. Mr. Lowry, when he gets on the stand, cannot tell you why he 
needs an easement going through my client's property. He can't tell 
you because there is absolutely no purpose. 
Even if this does not place the issue of public policy before the court, "An 
appellate court will apply the plain error standard of review to correct errors which 
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seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, 
to serve the ends of justice, and to prevent the denial of fundamental rights." In re 
TC, 121 Hawaifi 92, 98, 214 P.3d 1082, 1088 (App. 2009) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). 
The frivolousness of the case below and the erroneous outcome provides this 
court with sufficient reason to review the public policy issue under the plain error 
standard. 
The Court below erroneously applied UCA 73-1-8 and 57-13a-102 
Lowry erroneously asserts that "|t]he district court made no finding that the 
watercourse at issue was a "natural stream." However, the Court's Memorandum 
Decision and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (ROA 108-121, FOF % 8) 
states about the stream: 
8. The State Of Utah Division of Wildlife Resources owns a 
parcel of property on the east side of new Highway 89. Located on the 
State's property is a free flowing stream known as Crystal Springs. The 
water from Crystal Springs forms a stream that flows west through the 
State's property, then under new highway 89, then through the Palmer 
property and then under old highway 89 to the Lowry property. 
Furthermore, the Court found that the Utah Department of Natural 
Resources Division of Water Rights had informed Appellee Lowry that "because 
Crystal Springs stream is a natural stream Lowry would need a stream alteration 
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permit for" a pipeline Lowry had wanted to install. (Id. at f^ 12). Thus, the stream 
in question is undoubtedly - and was unquestionably understood by the court 
below to be - a natural stream. 
Lowry then argues that even if the waterway is a stream, 5 7-13 a-102 
nevertheless applies. Low i y is mistaken Palmer's arguments rele^ ant to this issi le 
are sufficientl\ briefed in Appellant's Brief and will not be repeated here. In 
connection with this issue, Lowry asserts that a contrary interpretation excluding 
natural streams "would deprive Appellees - owners of nearly all of the water 
rights to the Watercourse - of they conveyance right which they have enjoyed 
since at least the 1940s" (Appellee's Brief at 17). In fact, the right possessed by 
Lowry - his seven-tenths ownership of the rights in the water running in tlie 
stream - is not in any way impacted In (he lac I thai S7-] i.j-102 LU^^ not ipph in 
natural streams. 
Lowry erroneously asserts that Palmer misunderstood the court's decision 
with regard to its application of 73-1-8. Lowry states that, "Appellants miss the 
mark by arguing that Appellee's ownership of water rights cannot constitute 
ownership under the statute, when it is Appellee's easement that conveys 
ownership under the statute." (Appellee's Brief at I :>). However, Lowry s mis-
characterization of Palmer's argument of tl lis Issue is irrelevant since it remains 
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that the court erroneously granted an easement in the stream to Lowry in the first 
place. 
The Easement Granted by the Court Violates Public policy 
An easement in favor of Lowry across Palmer's property violates public 
policy where the court found that the purpose of Lowry's Complaint was nothing 
more than the continuation of a grudge match and "bitter feelings" between 
Lowry and Palmer. 
Lowry argues that the history of the parties' dispute is not a basis for a 
challenge on public policy grounds. (Appellee's Brief at 18-19). However, that 
the "big pissing contest," as it was described by the court, should end up in 
litigation and lead to the imposition of an easement where there is absolutely no 
purpose for one goes to the heart of the reasoning behind the public policy. 
As discussed at length in Appellant's Opening Brief, there is no legitimate 
purpose or reason for Lowry to come onto Palmer's property. As the owner of the 
watercourse, it is Palmer's duty to maintain it and if Lowry desires to make 
alterations, he would have to obtain a permit from the state and would then have 
statutory recourse if Palmer refused him admittance onto the property. 
Lowry should not be allowed to use the courts to further his own agenda in 
a grudge match against one of his neighbors. The Utah courts recognize a public 
8 
policy of unencumbered title and this case illustrates one reason for such policy: 
"to protect bona fide purchasers and to avoid conflicts of ownership, which may 
engender needless litigation." Alvey Development Corp v. Mackelprang, 2002 IJI 
App220,^[ 16, \ J U 4D . \ \ .\pp.-M'<^ 
CON CLl JSION 
The easement granted below is in violation of the statutes the court used to 
justify its imposition and a violation of public policy. Contrary to Appellee's 
contentions, the issues are not barred as those which were not preserved below 
were not presented until the court issued its decision. In any case, the 
egregiousness of the decision below won- : u; viir •• ^ ~ : \ -v^,: 
D A I ED this 7 A day of July, 2010. 
*«-AJ 
Douglas I/Neeley (ff62<?0) 
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